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“INTRODUCTION
SUBJECT OF OUR STUDY: RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY AND
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
IN this book we propose to study the most primitive and simple religion which is actually known, to make an analysis of it, and to attempt an explanation of it.  A religious system may be 
said to be the most primitive which we can observe when it fulfills the two following conditions: in the first place, when it is found in a society whose organization is surpassed by no others in 
simplicity; and secondly, when it is possible to explain it without making use of any element borrowed from a previous religion. 

We shall set ourselves to describe the organization of this system with all the exactness and fidelity that an ethnographer or an historian could give it. But our task will not be limited to 
that : sociology raises other problems than history or ethnography. It does not seek to know the passed forms of civilization with the sole end of knowing them and reconstructing them. But rather, like every positive science, it has as its object the explanation of some actual reality which is near to us, and which consequently is capable of affecting our ideas and our acts : this 
reality is man, and more precisely, the man of today, for there is nothing which we are more interested in knowing. Then we are not going to study a very archaic religion simply for the pleasure of telling its peculiarities and its singularities.  

1 In the same way, we shall say of these societies that they are primitive, and we shall call the men of these societies primitives. Undoubtedly the expression lacks precision, but that is hardly evitable, and besides, when we have taken pains to fix the meaning, it is not inconvenient. 

2 Elementary Forms of Religious Life 

If we have taken it as the subject of our research, it is because it has seemed to us better adapted than any other to lead to an understanding of the religious nature of man, that is to say, to show us an essential and permanent aspect of humanity. 

But this proposition is not accepted before the raising of strong objections. It seems very strange that one must turn back, and be transported to the very beginnings of history, in order to arrive at an understanding of humanity as it is at present. This manner of procedure seems particularly paradoxical in the question which 
concerns us. In fact, the various religions generally pass as being quite unequal in value and dignity ; it is said that they do not all contain the same quota of truth. Then it seems as though one could not compare the highest forms of religious thought with the lowest, without reducing the first to the level of the second. If 
we admit that the crude cults of the Australian tribes can help us to understand Christianity, for example, is that not supposing that this latter religion proceeds from the same mentality as the 
former, that it is made up of the same superstitions and rests upon the same errors. This is how the theoretical importance which has sometimes been attributed to primitive religions has come to pass as a sign of a systematic hostility to all religion, which, by prejudging the results of the study, vitiates them in 
advance. 

There is no occasion for asking here whether or not there are scholars who have merited this reproach, and who have made religious history and ethnology a weapon against religion. In any case, a sociologist cannot hold such a point of view. In fact, it is an essential postulate of sociology that a human institution cannot rest upon an error and a lie, without which it could not exist. If it were not founded in the nature of things, it would 
have encountered in the facts a resistance over which it could never have triumphed. So when we commence the study of primitive religions, it is with the assurance that they hold to reality and express it ; this principle will be seen to re-enter again and again in the course of the analyses and discussions which follow, and the reproach which we make against the schools from 
which we have separated ourselves is that they have ignored it.
"Heiwa elementary school 18" by ajari from Japan - cc 2.0
“Heiwa elementary school 18” by ajari from Japan – cc 2.0
When only the letter of the formulae is considered, these religious beliefs and practices undoubtedly seem disconcerting at times, and one is tempted to attribute them to some sort of a deep-rooted error. But one must know how to go underneath the symbol to the reality which it represents and which gives it its meaning. The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and 
^ the strangest myths translate some humain need, some aspect of life, either individual or social. The reasons with which the faithful justify them may be, and generally are, erroneous ; but the true reasons do not cease to exist, and it is the duty of science to discover them. 

In reality, then, there are no religions which are false. All are true in their own fashion ; all answer, though in different ways, to the given conditions of human existence. It is undeniably 
possible to arrange them in a hierarchy. Some can be called superior to others, in the sense that they call into play higher mental functions, that they are richer in ideas and sentiments, 
that they contain more concepts with fewer sensations and images, and that their arrangement is wiser. But howsoever read this greater complexity and this higher ideality may be, they are not sufficient to place the corresponding religions in different classes. All are religions equally, just as all living beings are equally alive, from the most humble plastids up to man. So when we turn to primitive religions it is not with the idea of depreciating religion in general, for these religions are no less respectable than ; 
the others. They respond to the same needs, they play the same rôle, they depend upon the same causes ; they can also well serve to show the nature of the religious life, and consequently to resolve the problem which we wish to study. 

But why give them a sort of prerogative? Why choose them in preference to all others as the subject of our study ? — It is merely for reasons of method. 

In the first place, we cannot arrive at an understanding of the most recent religions except by following the manner in which they have been progressively composed in history. In fact, 
historical analysis is the only means of explanation which it is possible to apply to them. It alone enables us to resolve an institution into its constituent elements, for it shows them to us 
as they are born in time, one after another. On the other hand, 
by placing every one of them in the condition where it was born, it puts into our hands the only means we have of determining the causes which gave rise to it. Every time that we undertake to 
explain something human, taken at a given moment in history — be it a religious belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an aesthetic style or an economic system — it is necessary to commence ( 
by going back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characteristics by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question. One readily understands the importance which the determination of the point of departure has for this series of progressive explanations, for all the others are attached to it. It was one of Descartes's principles that the first ring has a predominating place in the chain of scientific truths. But there is no question of 
placing at the foundation of the science of religions an idea elaborated after the cartesian manner, that is to say, a logical concept, a pure possibility, constructed simply by force of thought.
By Allan Ajifo
By Allan Ajifo
What we must find is a concrete reality, and historical and ethnological observation alone can reveal that to us. But even if this cardinal conception is obtained by a different process than that of Descartes, it remains true that it is destined to have a considerable influence on the whole series of propositions which the science 
establishes. Biological evolution has been conceived quite differently ever since it has been known that monocellular beings do exist. In the same way, the arrangement of religious facts is 
explained quite differently, according as we put naturism, animism or some other religious form at the beginning of the evolution. Even the most specialized scholars, if they are unwilling to confine themselves to a task of pure erudition, and if they desire to interpret the facts which they analyse, are obliged to choose one of these hypotheses, and make it their starting-point. Whether they desire it or not, the questions which they raise necessarily take the following form : how has naturism or animism been led to take this particular form, here or there, or to enrich itself or impoverish itself in such and such a fashion ? forest trees nature fog mist mystery woods
Since it is impossible to avoid taking sides on this initial problem, and since the solution given is destined to affect the whole science, it must be attacked at the outset : that is what we propose to do. 

Besides this, outside of these indirect reactions, the study of primitive religions has of itself an immediate interest which is of primary importance. 

If it is useful to know what a certain particular religion consists in, it is still more important to know what religion in general is. This is the problem which has aroused the interest of philosophers in all times ; and not without reason, for it is of interest to all humanity. Unfortunately, the method which they generally 
employ is purely dialectic : they confine themselves to analyzing the idea which they make for themselves of religion, except as they illustrate the results of this mental analysis by examples borrowed from the religions which best realize their ideal. But even if this method ought to be abandoned, the problem remains intact, and the great service of philosophy is to have prevented its being suppressed by the disdain of scholars. Now it is possible to attack it in a different way. Since all religions can be compared to each other, and since all are species of the same class, there are necessarily many elements which are common to all. antioch bible illuminated manuscript art medieval
We do not mean to speak simply of the outward and visible characteristics which they all have equally, and which make it possible to give them a provisional definition from the very outset of our researches ; the discovery of these apparent signs is relatively easy, for the observation which it demands does not go beneath the surface of things. But these external resemblances suppose others which are profound. At the foundation of all systems of beliefs and of all cults there ought necessarily to be a certain number of fundamental representations or conceptions and of ritual attitudes which, in spite of the diversity of forms which they have taken, have the same objective significance and fulfill the same functions everywhere. These are the permanent 
elements which constitute that which is permanent and human in religion ; they form all the objective contents of the idea which is expressed when one speaks of religion in general. How is it 
possible to pick them out ? 

Surely it is not by observing the complex religions which appear in the course of history. Every one of these is made up of such a variety of elements that it is very difficult to distinguish what is secondary from what is principal, the essential from the accessory. Suppose that the religion considered is like that of Egypt, India or the classical antiquity. It is a confused mass of many cults, varying according to the locality, the temples, the generations, the dynasties, the invasions, etc. Popular superstitions are there confused with the purest dogmas. Neither the thought nor the activity of the religion is evenly distributed among the believers ; according to the men, the environment and the circumstances, the beliefs as well as the rites are thought of in different ways. Here they are priests, there they are monks, elsewhere they are laymen ; there are mystics and rationalists, theologians and prophets, etc. In these conditions it is difficult to see what is common to all. In one or another of 
these systems it is quite possible to find the means of making a profitable study of some particular fact which is specially developed there, such as sacrifice or prophecy, monasticism or the mysteries ; but how is it possible to find the common foundation of the religious life underneath the luxuriant vegetation which covers it ? How is it possible to find, underneath the 
disputes of theology, the variations of ritual, the multiplicity of groups and the diversity of individuals, the fundamental states characteristic of religious mentality in general ? 

Things are quite different in the lower societies. The slighter development of individuality, the small extension of the group, the homogeneity of external circumstances, all contribute to reducing the differences and variations to a minimum. The 
group has an intellectual and moral conformity of which we find but rare examples in the more advanced societies. Everything is common to all. Movements are stereotyped ; everybody performs the same ones in the same circumstances, and this conformity of conduct only translates the conformity of thought. brain head mental psychology creativity inquiy
Every mind being drawn into the same eddy, the individual type nearly confounds itself vsdth that of the race. And while all is uniform, all is simple as well. Nothing is deformed like these 
myths, all composed of one and the same theme which is endlessly repeated, or like these rites made up of a small number of gestures repeated again and again. Neither the popular imagination nor that of the priests has had either the time or the means of refining and transforming the original substance of the religious ideas 
and practices ; these are shown in all their nudity, and offer themselves to an examination, it requiring only the slightest effort to lay them open. That which is accessory or secondary, the development of luxury, has not yet come to hide the principal elements.rect3336 space 
All is reduced to that which is indispensable, to that without which there could be no religion. But that which is indispensable is also that which is essential, that is to say, that which we must 
know before all else. 
rect3336 space Primitive civilizations offer privileged cases, then, because they are simple cases. That is why, in all fields of human activity, the observations of ethnologists have frequently been veritable 
revelations, which have renewed the study of human institutions. rect3336 space
For example, before the middle of the nineteenth century, everybody was convinced that the father was the essential element of the family ; no one had dreamed that there could be a family organization of which the paternal authority was not the keystone. But the discovery of Bachofen came and upset this old conception. Up to very recent times it was regarded as evident that the moral and legal relations of kindred were only another aspect of the psychological relations which result from a common descent ; Bachofen and his successors, MacLennan, Morgan and many others still laboured under this misunderstanding. But 
since we have become acquainted with the nature of the primitive clan, we know that, on the contrary, relationships cannot be explained by consanguinity. To return to religions, the study 
of only the most familiar ones had led men to believe for a long time that the idea of god was characteristic of everything that is religious. Now the religion which we are going to study presently 

^ But that is not equivalent to saying that all luxury is lacking to the primitive 
cults. On the contrary, we shall see that in every religion there are beUefs and 
practices which do not aim at strictly utilitarian ends (Bk. Ill, ch. iv, § 2). This 
luxury is indispensable to the religious life ; it is at its very heart. But it is 
much more rudimentary in the inferior religions than in the others, so we are 
better able to determine its reason for existence here. 



is, in a large part, foreign to all idea of divinity ; the forces to which the rites are there addressed are very different from those which occupy the leading place in our modem religions, yet they aid us in understanding these latter forces. So nothing is more unjust than the disdain with which too many historians still regard the work of ethnographers. Indeed, it is certain that 
ethnology has frequently brought about the most fruitful revolutions in the different branches of sociology. It is for this same reason that the discovery of unicellular beings, of which we just 
spoke, has transformed the current idea of life. Since in these very simple beings, life is reduced to its essential traits, these are less easily misunderstood. 

But primitive religions do not merely aid us in disengaging the constituent elements of religion; they also have the great advantage that they facilitate the explanation of it. Since the facts there are simpler, the relations between them are more apparent. The reasons with which men account for their acts have not yet been elaborated and denatured by studied reflection ; they are nearer and more closely related to the motives which 
have really determined these acts. In order to understand an hallucination perfectly, and give it its most appropriate treatment, a physician must know its original point of departure.rect3336 space 
Now this event is proportionately easier to find if he can observe it near its beginnings. The longer the disease is allowed to develop, the more it evades observation ; that is because all sorts of interpretations have intervened as it advanced, which tend to force the original state into the background, and across which it is frequently difficult to find the initial one. Between a 
systematized hallucination and the first impressions which gave it birth, the distance is often considerable. It is the same thing with religious thought. In proportion as it progresses in history, the causes which called it into existence, though remaining active, are no longer perceived, except across a vast scheme of interpretations which quite transform them.
"Kylix by Makron Mainade Satyros Staatliche Antikensammlungen 480BC Kat 94 02"
“Kylix by Makron Mainade Satyros Staatliche Antikensammlungen 480BC Kat 94 02”
Popular mythologies and subtile theologies have done their work : they have super-imposed upon the primitive sentiments others which are quite 
different, and which, though holding to the first, of which they are an elaborated form, only allow their true nature to appear very imperfectly. The psychological gap between the cause and the effect, between the apparent cause and the effective cause, has become more considerable and more difficult for the mind to leap. The remainder of this book will be an illustration and a verification of this remark on method. It will be seen how, in the primitive religions, the religious fact still visibly carries the mark of its origins : it would have been well-nigh impossible to infer them merely from the study of the more developed religions. 

The study which we are undertaking is therefore a way of taking up again, hut under new conditions, the old problem of the origin of religion. To be sure, if by origin we are to understand the very first beginning, the question has nothing scientific about it, and should be resolutely discarded. There was no given moment when religion began to exist, and there is consequently no need of finding a means of transporting ourselves thither in thought. Like every human institution, religion did not commence anywhere. Therefore, all speculations of this sort are justly discredited ; they can only consist in subjective and arbitrary 
constructions which are subject to no sort of control. But the problem which we raise is quite another one. What we want to do is to find a means of discerning the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice depend. Now for the reasons which were just set forth, these causes are proportionately more easily observable as the societies where they are observed are less complicated. That is why we 
try to get as near as possible to the origins.^ It is not that we ascribe particular virtues to the lower religions. On the contrary, they are rudimentary and gross ; we cannot make of them a sort of model which later religions only have to reproduce. But even their grossness makes them instructive, for they thus become convenient for experiments, as in them, the facts and their relations are easily seen. In order to discover the laws of the phenomena which he studies, the physicist tries to simplify these latter and rid them of their secondary characteristics. For that 
which concerns institutions, nature spontaneously makes the same sort of simplifications at the beginning of history. We merely wish to put these to profit. Undoubtedly we can only touch very elementary facts by this method. When we shall
have accounted for them as far as possible, the novelties of every sort which have been produced in the course of evolution will not yet be explained. But while we do not dream of denying the importance of the problems thus raised, we think that they will profit by being treated in their turn, and that it is important to take them up only after those of which we are going to undertake the study at present. 

* It is seen that we give a wholly relative sense to this word " origins," just as to the word " primitive." By it we do not mean an absolute beginning, but the most simple social condition that is actually known or that beyond which 
we cannot go at present. When we speak of the origins or of the commencement of religious history or thought, it is in this sense that our statements should be understood.
CC BY-NC-ND by st.delis
CC BY-NC-ND by st.delis
Subject of our Study 
II 

But our study is not of interest merely for the science of religion. In fact, every religion has one side by which it overlaps the circle of properly religious ideas, and there, the study 
of religious phenomena gives a means of renewing the problems which, up to the present, have only been discussed among philosophers. 

For a long time it has been known that the first systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There is no religion 
that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religion began by taking the place of 
the sciences and philosophy. But it has been less frequently noticed that religion has not confined itself to enriching the human intellect, formed beforehand, with a certain number of ideas ; it has contributed to forming the intellect itself. Men owe to it not only a good part of the substance of their knowledge, but also the form in which this knowledge has been elaborated. 

At the roots of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential ideas which dominate all our intellectual life ; they are what philosophers since Aristotle have called the categories of >- 
the understanding : ideas of time, space, ^ class, number, cause, substance, personality, etc. They correspond to the most universal properties of things. They are like the solid frame which encloses all thought ; this does not seem to be able to liberate itself from them without destroying itself, for it seems that we cannot think of objects that are not in time and space, which have no number, etc. Other ideas are contingent and unsteady ; we can conceive of their being unknown to a man, a society or an epoch ; but these others appear to be nearly inseparable from the normal working of the intellect. They are hke the framework of the intelligence. Now when primitive religious beliefs are systematically analysed, the principal categories are naturally 
found. They are bom in religion and of religion ; they are a product of religious thought. This is a statement that we are going to have occasion to make many times in the course of this work. 

* We say that time and space are categories because there is no difference between the rôle played by these ideas in the intellectual life and that which falls to the ideas of class or cause (on this point see, Hamelin, Essai sttr les- éléments principaux de la représentation, pp. 63, 76). 



This remark has some interest of itself already ; but here is what gives it its real importance. 

The general conclusion of the book which the reader has before him is that religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities ; the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of the assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups. So if the categories are of religious origin, they ought to participate in this nature common to all religious facts ; they too should be social affairs and the product of collective thought. At least — for in the actual condition of our knowledge of these matters, one should be careful to avoid all radical and exclusive statements — it is allowable to suppose that they are rich in social elements. 

Even at present, these can be imperfectly seen in some of them. For example, try to represent what the notion of time would be without the processes by which we divide it, measure it or express 
it with objective signs, a time which is not a succession of years, months, weeks, days and hours ! This is something nearly unthinkable. We cannot conceive of time, except on condition of distinguishing its different moments. Now what is the origin of this differentiation ? Undoubtedly, the states of consciousness which we have already experienced can be reproduced in us in the same order in which they passed in the first place ; thus portions of our past become present again, though being clearly distinguished from the present. But howsoever important this distinction may be for our private experience, it is far from being enough to constitute the notion or category of time. This does not consist merely in a commemoration, either partial or integral, of our past life. It is an abstract and impersonal frame which surrounds, not only our individual existence, but that of all humanity. It is like an endless chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, and upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and determined guide lines. It is not my time that is thus arranged ; it is time in general, such as it is objectively thought of by everybody in a single civilization. That alone is enough to give us a hint that such an arrangement ought to be collective. And in reality, observation proves that these indispensable guidelines, in relation to which all things are temporally located, are taken from social life. The divisions into days, weeks, months, years, etc., correspond to the periodical recurrence of rites, feasts, and public ceremonies.^ 

^ See the support given this assertion in Hubert and Mauss, Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions (Travaux de l'Année Sociologique), chapter on La Représentation du Temps dans la Religion. 



A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity. ^ 

It is the same thing with space. As Hamelin has shown, ^ space is not the vague and indetermined medium which Kant imagined ; if purely and absolutely homogeneous, it would be of no use, and could not be grasped by the mind. Spatial representation consists essentially in a primary co-ordination of the data of sensuous experience. But this co-ordination would be impossible if the parts of space were qualitatively equivalent and if they were really interchangeable. To dispose things spatially there must be a possibility of placing them differently, of putting some at the right, others at the left, these above, those below, at the north of or at the south of, east or west of, etc., etc., just as to dispose states of consciousness temporally there must be a possibility of localizing them at determined dates. That is to say that space could not be what it is if it were not, like time, divided and differentiated. But whence come these divisions which are so essential ? By themselves, there are 
neither right nor left, up nor down, north nor south, etc. All these distinctions evidently come from the fact that different sympathetic values have been attributed to various regions. Since 
all the men of a single civilization represent space in the same way, it is clearly necessary that these sympathetic values, and the distinctions which depend upon them, should be equally universal, and that almost necessarily implies that they be of social origin.* 

Besides that, there are cases where this social character is made manifest. There are societies in Australia and North America where space is conceived in the form of an immense circle, because the camp has a circular form ; * and this spatial circle is divided up exactly like the tribal circle, and is in its 

^ Thus we see all the difference which exists between the group of sensations and images which serve to locate us in time, and the category of time. The first are the summary of individual experiences, which are of value only for the 
person who experienced them. But what the category of time expresses is a time common to the group, a social time, so to speak. In itself it is a veritable social institution. Also, it is peculiar to man ; animals have no representations 
of this sort. 

*This distinction between the category of time and the correspondmg sensations could be made equally well in regard to space or cause. Perhaps this would sdd in clearing up certain confusions which are maintained by the controversies 
of which these questions are the subject. We shall return to this point in the conclusion of the present work (§4). * Op. cit., pp. 75 fi. 

' Or else it would be necessary to admit that all individuals, in virtue of their organo-physical constitution, are spontaneously affected in the same manner by the different parts of space : which is more improbable, especially 
as in themselves the different regions are sympathetically indifferent. Also, the divisions of space vary with difierent societies, which is a proof that they are not founded exclusively upon the congenital nature of man. 

* See Durkheim and Mauss, De quelques formes primitives de classification, in Année Sociologique, VI, pp. 47 fi. 




image. There are as many regions distinguished as there are clans in the tribe, and it is the place occupied by the clans inside the encampment which has determined the orientation of these regions. Each region is defined by the totem of the clan to which it is assigned. Among the Zufii, for example, the pueblo contains seven quarters ; each of these is a group of clans which has had 
a unity : in all probability it was originally a single clan which was later subdivided. Now their space also contains seven quarters, and each of these seven quarters of the world is in intimate connection with a quarter of the pueblo, that is to say with a group of clans. ^ " Thus," says Gushing, " one division is thought to be in relation with the north, another represents the west, another the south," etc.^ Each quarter of the pueblo has its characteristic colour, which symbolizes it ; each region has its colour, which is exactly the same as that of the corresponding quarter. In the course of history the number of 
fundamental clans has varied ; the number of the fundamental regions of space has varied with them. Thus the social organization has been the model for the spatiaJ organization and a reproduction of it. It is thus even up to the distinction between 
right and left which, far from being inherent in the nature of man in general, is very probably the product of representations which are religious and therefore collective.^ 

Analogous proofs will be found presently in regard to the ideas of class, force, personality and efficacy. It is even possible to ask if the idea of contradiction does not also depend upon social 
conditions. What makes one tend to believe this is that the empire which the idea has exercised over human thought has varied with times and societies. To-day the principle of identity dominates scientific thought ; but there are vast systems of 
representations which have played a considerable rôle in the history of ideas where it has frequently been set aside : these are the mythologies, from the grossest up to the most reasonable.* There, we are continually coming upon beings which 
' See Durkheim and Mauss, De quelques formes primitives de classification, in 
Année Sociologique, VI, p. 34. 

* Zuni Creation Myths, in i^th Rep. of the Bureau of Amer. Ethnol., pp. 367 fl. 
' See Hertz, La prééminence de la main droite. /Aude de polarité religieuse, in 

the Revue Philosophique, Dec. , 1909. On this same question of the relations between the representation of space and the form of the group, see the chapter in Ratzel, Politische Géographie, entitled Der Raum in Geist der Vôlker. 

* We do not mean to say that mythological thought ignores it, but that it contradicts it more frequently and openly than scientific thought does. 
Inversely, we shall show that science cannot escape violating it, though it holds to it far more scrupulously than religion does. On this subject, as on many others, there are only differences of degree between science and religion ; but if these difierences should not be exaggerated, they must be noted, for they are significant. 

have the most contradictory attributes simultaneously, who are at the same time one and many, material and spiritual, who can divide themselves up indefinitely without losing anything of their constitution ; in mythology it is an axiom that the part is worth the whole. These variations through which the rules which seem to govern our present logic have passed prove that, 
far from being engraven through all eternity upon the mental constitution of men, they depend, at least in part, upon factors that are historical and consequently social. We do not know exactly what they are, but we may presume that they exist. ^ 

This hypothesis once admitted, the problem of knowledge is posed in new terms. 

Up to the present there have been only two doctrines in the field. For some, the categories cannot be derived from experience : they are logically prior to it and condition it. They are represented as so many simple and irreducible data, imminent in the human mind by virtue of its inborn constitution. For this reason they are said to be a priori. Others, however, hold that they are constructed and made up of pieces and bits, and that the individual is the artisan of this construction. ^ 

But each solution raises grave difficulties. 

Is the empirical thesis the one adopted ? Then it is necessary to deprive the categories of all their characteristic properties. As a matter of fact they are distinguished from all other knowledge by their universality and necessity. They are the most general concepts which exist, because they are applicable to all that is real, and since they are not attached to any particular 
object they are independent of every particular subject ; they constitute the common field where all minds meet. Further, they must meet there, for reason, which is nothing more than all the fundamental categories taken together, is invested with an authority which we could not set aside if we would. When we attempt to revolt against it, and to free ourselves from some 

* This hypothesis has already been set forth by the founders of the Volker-psychologie. It is especially remarked in a short article by Windelbrôuid entitled Die Erkenntnisslehre unter dem Volkerpsychologischen Gesichtspunke, in the Zeitsch. f. V'ilkerpsychologie, viii, pp. i66 ff. Cf. a note of Steinthal on the same 
subject, ibid., pp. 178 fi. 

* Even in the theory of Spencer, it is by individual experience that the categories are made. The only difference which there is in this regard between ordinary empiricism and evolutionary empiricism is that according to this latter, the results of individual experience are accumulated by heredity. But this accumulation adds nothing essential to them ; no element enters into their composition which does not have its origin in the experience of the individual. 
According to this theory, also, the necessity with which the categories actually impose themselves upon us is the product of an illusion and a superstitious prejudice, strongly rooted in the organism, to be sure, but without foundation in the nature of things. 


of these essential ideas, we meet with great resistances. They do not merely depend upon us, but they impose themselves upon us. Now empirical data present characteristics which are diametrically opposed to these. A sensation or an image always relies upon a determined object, or upon a collection of objects of the same sort, and expresses the momentary condition of a particular consciousness ; it is essentially individual and subjective. We therefore have considerable liberty in dealing with the representations of such an origin. It is true that when our sensations are actual, they impose themselves upon us in fact. 
But by right we are free to conceive them otherwise than they really are, or to represent them to ourselves as occurring in a different order from that where they are really produced. In 
regard to them nothing is forced upon us except as considerations of another sort intervene. Thus we find that we have here two sorts of knowledge, which are like the two opposite poles of the intelligence. Under these conditions forcing reason back upon experience causes it to disappear, for it is equivalent to reducing 
the universality and necessity which characterize it to pure appearance, to an illusion which may be useful practically, but which corresponds to nothing in reality ; consequently it is denying all objective reality to the logical life, whose regulation and organization is the function of the categories. Classical empiricism results in irrationalism ; perhaps it would even be fitting to designate it by this latter name. 

In spite of the sense ordinarily attached to the name, the apriorists have more respect for the facts. Since they do not admit it as a truth established by evidence that the categories 
are made up of the same elements as our sensual representations, they are not obliged to impoverish them systematically, to draw from them all their real content, and to reduce them to nothing more than verbal artifices. On the contrary, they leave them all their specific characteristics. The apriorists are the rationalists ; they believe that the world has a logical aspect which the reason expresses excellently. But for all that, it is necessary for them to give the mind a certain power of transcending experience and of adding to that which is given to it directly ; and of this singular power they give neither explanation nor justification. 
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For it is no explanation to say that it is inherent in the nature of the human intellect. It is necessary to show whence we hold this surprising prerogative and how it comes that we can see certain relations in things which the examination of these things cannot reveal to us. Saying that only on this condition is experience itself possible changes the problem perhaps, but does not answer it. For the real question is to know how it comes that experience is not sufficient unto itself, but presupposes certain conditions which are exterior and prior to it, and how it happens that these conditions are reaUzed at the moment and in the manner that is desirable. To answer these questions it has sometimes been assumed that above the reason of individuals there is a superior and perfect reason from which the others emanate and from which they get this marvellous power of theirs, by a sort of mystic participation : this is the divine reason.
Parthenon Fredric Edwin Church
Parthenon Fredric Edwin Church
But this hypothesis has at least the one grave disadvantage of being deprived of all experimental control ; thus it does not satisfy the conditions demanded of a scientific hypothesis. More than that, the categories of human thought are never fixed in any one definite form ; they are made, unmade and remade incessantly ; they change with places and times. On the other hand, the divine reason is immutable. How can this immutability give rise to this incessant variability ? 

Such are the two conceptions that have been pitted against each other for centuries ; and if this debate seems to be eternal, it is because the arguments given are really about equivalent. If reason is only a form of individual experience, it no longer exists. On the other hand, if the powers which it has are recognized but not accounted for, it seems to be set outside the confines of nature and science. In the face of these two opposed objections the mind remains uncertain. But if the social origin of the categories is admitted, a new attitude becomes possible, which we believe will enable us to escape both of the opposed difficulties. 

The fundamental proposition of the apriorist theory is that knowledge is made up of two sorts of elements, which cannot be reduced into one another, and which are like two distinct layers superimposed one upon the other. ^ Our hypothesis keeps this principle intact. In fact, that knowledge which is called empirical, the only knowledge of which the theorists of empiricism 
have made use in constructing the reason, is that which is brought into our minds by the direct action of objects. It is composed of individual states which are completely explained ^ by the 
psychical nature of the individual. If, on the other hand, the categories are, as we believe they are, essentially collective 

^ Perhaps some will be surprised that we do not define the apriorist theory by the hypothesis of innateness. But this conception really plays a secondary part in the doctrine. It is a simple way of stating the impossibility of reducing rational knowledge to empirical data. Saying that the former is innate is only a positive way of saying that it is not the product of experience, such as it is ordinarily conceived. 

* At least, in so far as there are any representations which are individual 
and hence wholly empirical. But there are in fact probably none where the two 
elements are not found closely united. 

\ representations, before all else, they should show the mental states of the group ; they should depend upon the way in which 

 this is founded and organized, upon its morphology, upon its religious, moral and economic institutions, etc. So between these two sorts of representations there is all the difference which  exists between the individual and the social, and one can no tiore derive the second from the first than he can deduce society from the individual, the whole from the part, the complex from the simple. Society is a reality sui generis ; it has its own peculiar characteristics, which are not found elsewhere and ^ which are not met with again in the same form in all the rest of the universe. The representations which express it have a wholly different contents from purely individual ones and we may rest assured in advance that the first add something to the second. 

Even the manner in which the two are formed results in differentiating them. Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well ; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments ; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience 
and their knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infinitely richer and complexer than that of the individual. From that one can understand how 
the reason has been able to go beyond the limits of empirical knowledge. It does not owe this to any vague mysterious virtue but simply to the fact that according to the well-known formula, man is double. There are two beings in him : an individual being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle of I whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being 
which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation — I mean society.
CC BY-NC-ND by Gerard Van der Leun
CC BY-NC-ND by Gerard Van der Leun
This duality of our nature has as its consequence in the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral ideal to a utilitarian motive, I and in the order  thought, the irrèdùcibilit of reason, of 
individual experience. In so far as he belongs to society, the individual transcends himself, both when he thinks and when he acts.

^ This irreducibility must not be taken in any absolute sense. We do not wish to say that there is nothing in the empirical representations which shows rational ones, nor that there is nothing in the individual which could be taken as a sign of social life. If experience were completely separated from all that is rational, reason could not operate upon it ; in the same way, if the psychic nature of the individual were absolutely opposed to the social life, society would be impossible. A complete analysis of the categories should seek these germs of rationality even in the individual consciousness. We shall have occasion to come back to this point in our conclusion. All that we wish to establish here is that between these indistinct germs of reason and the reason properly so called, there is a difference comparable to that which separates the properties of the mineral elements out of which a living being is composed from the characteristic 
attributes of life after this has once been constituted. 



 

This same social character learns to an understanding of the origin of the necessity of the categories. It is said that an idea is necessary when it imposes itself upon the mind by some sort of virtue of its own, Without being accompanied by any proof. It contains within it something which constrains the intelligence 
and which leads to its acceptance without preliminary examination. The apriorist postulates this singular quality, but does not 
account for it ; for saying that the categories are necessary because they are indispensable to the functioning of the intellect is simply repeating that they are necessary. But if they really have the origin which we attribute to them, their ascendancy no longer has anything surprising in it. They represent the most general relations which exist between things ; surpassing all our other ideas in extension, they dominate all the details of our intellectual life. If men did not apree upon these essential ideas at every moment, if they did not have the same conception of time, space, cause, number, etc., all contact between their minds would be impossible, and with that, all life together.
CC BY-SA by The Cabin On The Road
CC BY-SA by The Cabin On The Road
Thus society could not abandon the categories to the free choice of the individual without abandoning itself. If it is to live there 
is not merely need of a satisfactory moral conformity, but also there is a minimum of logical conformity beyond which it cannot safely go. For this reason it uses all its authority upon its 
members to forestall such dissidences. Does a mind ostensibly free itself from these forms of thought ? It is no longer considered a human mind in the full sense of the word, and is treated accord- 
ingly. That is why we feel that we are no longer completely free and that something resists, both within and outside ourselves, when we attempt to rid ourselves of these fundamental notions, even in our own conscience. Outside of us there is public opinion which judges us ; but more than that, since society is also represented inside of us, it sets itself against these revolutionary 
fancies, even inside of ourselves ; we have the feeling that we cannot abandon them if our whole thought is not to cease being really human. This seems to be the origin of the exceptional authority which is inherent in the reason and which makes us accept its suggestions with confidence. It is the very authority of society,^ transferring itself to a certain manner of thought which is the indispensable condition of all common action. The necessity with which the categories are imposed upon us is not 

* It has frequently been remarked that social disturbances result in multiplying mental disturbances. This is one more proof that logical discipline is a special aspect of social discipline. The first gives way as the second is weakened. 

the effect of simple habits whose yoke we could easily throw off with a little effort ; nor is it a physical or metaphysical necessity, since the categories change in different places and times ; it is a special sort of moral necessity which is to the intellectual life what moral obligation is to the will.^ 

But if the categories originally only translate social states, does it not follow that they can be applied to the rest of nature only as metaphors ? If they were made merely to express social conditions, it seems as though they could not be extended to other realms except in this sense. Thus in so far as they aid us in thinking of the physical or biological world, they have only 
the value of artificial symbols, useful practically perhaps, but having no connection with reality. Thus we come back, by a different road, to nominalism and empiricism. 

But when we interpret a sociological theory of knowledge in this way, we forget that even if society is a specific reality it is not an empire within an empire ; it is a part of nature, and in- 
deed its highest representation. The social realm is a natural realm which differs from the others only by a greater complexity. Now it is impossible that nature should differ radically from itself in the one case and the other in regard to that which is most essential. The fundamental relations that exist between things — just that which it is the function of the categories to express — cannot be essentially dissimilar in the different realms. 
If, for reasons which we shall discuss later, ^ they are more clearly disengaged in the social world, it is nevertheless impossible that they should not be found elsewhere, though in less pronounced forms. Society makes them more manifest but it does not have a monopoly upon them. That is why ideas which have been elaborated on the model of social things can aid us in thinking of another department of nature. It is at least true that if these ideas play the rôle of symbols when they are thus turned aside from their original signification, they are well-founded symbols. 
If a sort of artificiality enters into them from the mere fact that 

* There is an analogy between this logical necessity and moral obligation but there is not an actual identity. To-day society treats criminals in a different fashion than subjects whose intelligence only is abnormal ; that is a proof that the authority attached to logical rules and that inherent in moral rules are not of the same nature, in spite of certain similarities. They are two species of the same class. It would be interesting to make a study on the nature and origin of 
this difference, which is probably not primitive, for during a long time, the public conscience has poorly distinguished between the deranged and the delinquent. We confine ourselves to signalizing this question. By this example, one may see the number of problems which are raised by the analysis of these 
notions which generally pass as being elementary and simple, but which are really of an extreme complexity. 

' This question will be treated again in the conclusion of this work. 


they are constructed concepts, it is an artificiality which follows nature very closely and which is constantly approaching it still 
more closely. ^ From the fact that the ideas of time, space, class, cause or personality are constructed out of social elements, it is 
not necessary to conclude that they are devoid of all objective value. On the contrary, their social origin rather leads to the belief that they are not without foundation in the nature of things.^ 

Thus renovated, the theory of knowledge seems destined to unite the opposing advantages of the two rival theories, without incurring their inconveniences. It keeps all the essential principles of the apriorists ; but at the same time it is inspired by that positive spirit which the empiricists have striven to satisfy. 
It leaves the reason its specific power, but it accounts for it and does so without leaving the world of observable phenomena. venus earth planet space
It affirms the duality of our intellectual Ufe, but it explains it, and with natural causes. The categories are no longer considered as primary and unanalysable facts, yet they keep a complexity which falsifies any analysis as ready as that with 
which the empiricists content themselves. They no longer appear as very simple notions which the first comer can very easily arrange from his own personal observations and which the popular imagination has unluckily complicated, but rather they appear as priceless instruments of thought which the human groups have laboriously forged through the centuries and where they have accumulated the best of their intellectual capital.^ media papers newspaper
A complete section of the history of humanity is resumed therein. This is equivalent to saying that to succeed in understanding them and judging them, it is necessary to resort to other means 

1 The rationalism which is imminent in the sociological theory of knowledge is thus midway between the classical empiricism and apriorism. For the first, the categories are purely artificial constructions ; for the second, on the contrary, they are given by nature ; for us, they are in a sense a work of art, but of an art 
which imitates nature with a perfection capable of increasing unlimitedly. 

2 For example, that which is at the foundation of the category of time is the rhythm of social life ; but if there is a rhythm in collective life, one may rest assured that there is another in the life of the individual, and more generally, in that of the universe. The first is merely more marked and apparent than the others. In the same way, we shall see that the notion of class is founded on that of the human group. But if men form natural groups, it can be assumed that among things there exists groups which are at once analogous and different. Classes and species are natural groups of things. 

If it seems to many minds that a social origin cannot be attributed to the 
categories without depriving them of all speculative value, it is because society 
is still too frequently regarded as something that is not natural ; hence it is 
concluded that the representations which express it express nothing in nature. 
But the conclusion is not worth more than the premise. 

* This is how it is legitimate to compare the categories to tools ; for on its 
side, a tool is material accumulated capital. There is a close relationship between 
the three ideas of tool, category and institution. 



than those which have been in use up to the present. To know what these conceptions which we have not made ourselves are really made of, it does not suffice to interrogate our own consciousnesses ; we must look outside of ourselves, it is history that we must observe, there is a whole science which must be formed, a complex science which can advance but slowly and by collective labour, and to which the present work brings some fragmentary contributions in the nature of an attempt. Without making these questions the direct object of our study, we shall 
profit by all the occasions which present themselves to us of catching at their very birth some at least of these ideas which, while being of religious origin, still remain at the foundation of the human intelligence." Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life; Introduction